Nordic Electricity Congestion's Arrangement as a Model for Europe: Physical Constraints or Operators' Opportunity

Nordic Electricity Congestion's Arrangement as a Model for Europe: Physical Constraints or Operators' Opportunit

Nordic electricity congestion's arrangement as a model for Europe : physical constraints or operators' opportunism?

Congestion on power grids seems a physical reality, a "hard" fact easy to check. Our paper models a different idea: congestion signal may be distorted by transmission system operators (TSOs), which puts the European integrated electricity market at risk. 1ʻ when the TSOs share the revenue produced by congestion's pricing they have an incentive in distorting data. 2ʻ because congestion signals are not physical data but "home made" conventions, TSOs could be able distorting them. 3ʻ when congestion appears on cross border lines that link several countries with their own regulatory mechanisms, the settlement of this incentive's problem necessitates a high degree of coordination. Congestion puts undoubtedly the threat of a collapse on interconnected grids. The "capacity constrained situations" have therefore to be avoided. Congestion signalling depends on norms set by TSOs and a signal is given when the power flows attain the "secure" limits set by TSOs. These security norms are not stable and invariable because some flexibility is needed by the very nature of the power flows and because lines physical capacity limits are not constant. Therefore TSOs are defining the congestion signal on a variable, complex and non transparent constraint and may manipulate it for their own interests. In Nordic countries the "Light Handed Regulation" makes this opportunistic behaviour more likely. We need a more effective congestion regulatory mechanism.Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions: An experimental approach to European solutions

International audienceCompetition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the "implicit auction", already used in some countries, and (ii) the "coordinated explicit auction", proposed by the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) but not implemented yet. The main advantage of the explicit auction is that it allows each country to keep its own power exchange running. In the European institutional context, this is seen as a factor of success of a market reform, although the explicit auction (not coordinated) is known to be less efficient than the implicit mechanism. The addition of a coordination dimension in the explicit auction is intended to solve problems of international flows. We use an experimental methodology to identify and compare in a laboratory setting the efficiency properties of these two market mechanisms, given a market structure similar to the existing one in continental Europe, i.e. a competitive oligopoly. Our main result highlights the inefficiency of the coordinated explicit auction compared to the performance of the implicit auction, measured in terms of both energy prices and transmission capacity allocation. We suggest that the poor performance of the coordinated explicit auction in the laboratory is due to the level of individual expectations about both energy and transmission prices that the mechanism demands. One solution to resolve this problem when the mechanism is implemented in the field would be to design an additional and secondary market for "used" transmission capacity

Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions: An experimental approach to European solutions

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: (i) the "implicit auction", already used in some countries, and (ii) the "coordinated explicit auction", proposed by the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) but not implemented yet. The main advantage of the explicit auction is that it allows each country to keep its own power exchange running. In the European institutional context, this is seen as a factor of success of a market reform, although the explicit auction (not coordinated) is known to be less efficient than the implicit mechanism. The addition of a coordination dimension in the explicit auction is intended to solve problems of international flows. We use an experimental methodology to identify and compare in a laboratory setting the efficiency properties of these two market mechanisms, given a market structure similar to the existing one in continental Europe, i.e. a competitive oligopoly. Our main result highlights the inefficiency of the coordinated explicit auction compared to the performance of the implicit auction, measured in terms of both energy prices and transmission capacity allocation. We suggest that the poor performance of the coordinated explicit auction in the laboratory is due to the level of individual expectations about both energy and transmission prices that the mechanism demands. One solution to resolve this problem when the mechanism is implemented in the field would be to design an additional and secondary market for "used" transmission capacity.auctions; congestion management; electricity markets; experimental economics

Assessing the impacts of shoreline hardening on beach response to hurricanes: Saint-Barthélemy, Lesser Antilles

International audienc

The Accuracy of Clinical Staging of Stage I-IIIa Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer : An Analysis Based on Individual Participant Data

BACKGROUND: Clinical staging of non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) helps determine the prognosis and treatment of patients; few data exist on the accuracy of clinical staging and the impact on treatment and survival of patients. We assessed whether participant or trial characteristics were associated with clinical staging accuracy as well as impact on survival. METHODS: We used individual participant data from randomized controlled trials (RCTs), supplied for a meta-analysis of preoperative chemotherapy (+/- radiotherapy) vs surgery alone (+/- radiotherapy) in NSCLC. We assessed agreement between clinical TNM (cTNM) stage at randomization and pathologic TNM (pTNM) stage, for participants in the control group. RESULT: Results are based on 698 patients who received surgery alone (+/- radiotherapy) with data for cTNM and pTNM stage. Forty-six percent of cases were cTNM stage I, 23% were cTNM stage II, and 31% were cTNM stage IIIa. cTNM stage disagreed with pTNM stage in 48% of cases, with 34% clinically understaged and 14% clinically overstaged. Agreement was not associated with age (P = .12), sex (P = .62), histology (P = .82), staging method (P = .32), or year of randomization (P = .98). Poorer survival in understaged patients was explained by the underlying pTNM stage. Clinical staging failed to detect T4 disease in 10% of cases and misclassified nodal disease in 38%. CONCLUSION: This study demonstrates suboptimal agreement between clinical and pathologic staging. Discrepancies between clinical and pathologic T and N staging could have led to different treatment decisions in 10% and 38% of cases, respectively. There is therefore a need for further research into improving staging accuracy for patients with stage I-IIIa NSCLC.Peer reviewe

Congestion management in the Nordic power market : counter purchases and zonal pricing

In this paper, we investigate methods for managing congestion on the grid in the Nordic power market. Specifically, we have considered the differences between using counter purchases as opposed to pricing out the transmission constraints of the grid. We show that the specific method used for congestion management greatly affects prices and therefore the surplus of the various agents, including the system operator. This means that the market agents may have preferences for one method, and take actions in order to influence which method is to be used. Based on this we have studied the incentives and possibilities of "moving" capacity constraints, and the effect this has on system performance. We have also looked into the differences between various pricing schemes, i.e. optimal nodal prices versus optimal zonal prices